Championship banners are eternal. Winning a title erases past mistakes. This is why Joe Dumars is often excused by Detroit Pistons fans and the NBA community for drafting Darko Miličić over Carmelo Anthony, Chris Bosh, and Dwyane Wade. That decision led to a championship. When Dumars` legacy as a general manager is discussed in the future, that title will be mentioned first.
As reported on Tuesday, Dumars is set to assume his first leading executive role since leaving the Pistons over a decade ago. He will be the new president of basketball operations for the New Orleans Pelicans.
Considering his new position, it`s worth asking: have the Pelicans reviewed Dumars` actions after winning that championship? That title was won in 2004, and the subsequent 21 years have been less kind to Dumars than the years leading up to it. In fact, it`s difficult to find a single, undeniably successful move he`s made in the two decades since that championship.
Let`s delve into Dumars` later career to understand why the Pelicans` decision is one of the most perplexing front-office moves in recent NBA history, and more importantly, why it seems like a poor choice.
Dumars` Draft History Post-2004
Joe Dumars made eight first-round picks for the Pistons after their 2004 championship. Let`s examine each pick, evaluating their output and the available alternatives at those draft positions.
- 2005: Jason Maxiell at No. 26 overall was a reasonable pick, becoming a solid NBA role player. However, four picks later, the New York Knicks drafted future All-Star David Lee, also a power forward.
- 2007: Rodney Stuckey at No. 15 was another acceptable but unspectacular choice. He played in the NBA for a decade, averaging 16.6 points per game at his peak, but never became an All-Star or a strong starter on a winning team. There were no clear better options in the draft at that spot.
- 2007: Arron Afflalo at No. 27. A good pick. A solid 3-and-D role player at the end of the first round is valuable. We will discuss where this went wrong shortly.
- 2009: Austin Daye at No. 15 is where regrets begin. Daye underperformed professionally, while Jrue Holiday (No. 17) and Jeff Teague (No. 19) became successful players. Either would have been logical choices, especially since the Pistons had recently traded Chauncey Billups and needed backcourt reinforcement. Instead, they chose a forward who spent much of his career overseas.
- 2010: Greg Monroe at No. 7 overall was a reasonable pick at the time, though Dumars didn`t realize the league was evolving. Monroe was a post-up scorer in a league moving away from post-up play. Two picks later, the Utah Jazz selected Gordon Hayward, and the Indiana Pacers followed with Paul George. These versatile wings were the future, and the Pistons missed both. Monroe received a max contract in 2015 free agency, but with the Milwaukee Bucks.
- 2011: Brandon Knight at No. 8 is a painful miss. Knight was a decent player, but one pick later, the Charlotte Bobcats selected Kemba Walker, who became an All-Star. Two picks after that, the Golden State Warriors picked another star guard, Klay Thompson. The most significant miss? At No. 15, the San Antonio Spurs drafted Kawhi Leonard. All three were plausible Detroit picks and had far more successful careers than Knight, who later hurt the Pistons in another way.
- 2012: Andre Drummond at No. 9 overall is likely Dumars` best post-2004 decision. He became an All-Star. However, his teams never won more than 44 games, and his style clashed with Monroe. Both were traditional, non-shooting big men in a league favoring lineups with only one such player. This again showed Dumars` failure to foresee league trends. The Pistons lost Monroe for nothing because he didn`t want to play power forward next to Drummond.
- 2013: Kentavious Caldwell-Pope at No. 8 overall was a good, winning player, but another high draft pick the Pistons lost in free agency, limiting the value extracted. C.J. McCollum (No. 10) or Giannis Antetokounmpo (No. 15) would have been more impactful. Antetokounmpo might have been a risky pick at No. 8, but consider this: all eight players were from the American college system. This might be coincidence, or it might indicate Dumars was hesitant about international prospects after Miličić. The truth is likely a mix of both.
While some good players are on this list, only Drummond had a notable career as a Piston, and even he never won a playoff game for Detroit. Failing to secure a single long-term difference-maker over a decade of drafts is problematic. In fairness, we only reviewed first-round picks. Dumars` best draft pick in this period was a second-rounder who became a reliable All-Star for a contender, leading us to Dumars` trading record.
Dumars` Trading History Post-2004
In July 2013, the Pistons and Bucks traded lottery-drafted point guards. The Pistons acquired Brandon Jennings (No. 10 pick in 2009), and the Bucks got Brandon Knight (No. 8 in 2011). Jennings was more established but needed a new contract as a restricted free agent. Knight had two years left on his rookie deal. Initially, a one-for-one trade seemed fair, but Milwaukee convinced Detroit to include two lesser-known prospects. Viacheslav Kravstov didn`t achieve much in the NBA. However, the No. 39 pick in the 2012 NBA Draft became quite successful: Khris Middleton.
This was a recurring issue in Dumars` later Detroit years: finding good prospects but trading them before they developed. A similar, less impactful move was in 2009, trading 22-year-old Amir Johnson to the Toronto Raptors for 34-year-old Fabricio Oberto, who was immediately waived. Johnson became a key role player for the Raptors during the early Kyle Lowry and DeMar DeRozan era. Arron Afflalo, after 17 starts in his first two seasons, was traded to Denver for a second-round pick in 2009 and became a full-time starter and strong 3-and-D player.
These were significant misses originating from marginal moves. Hitting on these margins is important, especially for smaller markets, but executive careers are defined by major decisions. Dumars` biggest post-2004 trade occurred early in the 2008-09 season. After reaching the Eastern Conference Finals, Dumars traded Chauncey Billups to the Denver Nuggets for Allen Iverson. This worked out well for the Nuggets; Billups led them to within two games of the NBA Finals.
But for Detroit? Not so much. The Pistons fell to 39-43. Iverson lost playing time to Stuckey, who seemed like Detroit`s point guard of the future. The real damage from the trade was in the following summer. A motive for trading Billups was to create cap space for free agency. Detroit had a strong league reputation then, and there were rumors they might pursue LeBron James or players they missed in 2003, like Bosh and Wade, in the famed 2010 free agency. Let`s see who they signed.
Dumars` Free Agency History Post-2004
Dumars didn`t wait until 2010 to use his cap space. Instead, he spent in the underwhelming 2009 market, signing Ben Gordon to a five-year deal worth $55-60 million and Charlie Villanueva to a five-year, $40 million deal. These numbers seem small now, but the cap is about 2.4 times higher today. In 2024-25 dollars, Gordon`s contract would be $134-146 million, and Villanueva`s would be around $97 million.
How did these deals turn out? Gordon averaged 12.4 points in three Detroit seasons. He was then traded to the Charlotte Bobcats for Corey Maggette. Detroit convinced Charlotte to take Gordon by including a 2014 first-round pick, which became No. 8 overall, a steep price for one year of savings. Villanueva started 27 games in five seasons with the Pistons and never averaged 12 points per game in Detroit.
Amazingly, neither was Dumars` worst signing. With money saved by trading Gordon in 2012, Dumars signed Josh Smith to a four-year, $54 million deal in 2013. This contract was so disastrous that Dumars` replacement, Stan Van Gundy, used the waive-and-stretch provision to release Smith early in his second season. This saved short-term money but extended payments until 2020.
While these were bad signings, it`s also worth noting a deal Dumars didn`t make. In 2006, after losing in the Eastern Conference Finals, the Pistons let Ben Wallace leave in free agency for a four-year, $60 million contract with the Chicago Bulls. On paper, it made sense as Wallace was declining, and 2006 was his last All-Star and Defensive Player of the Year season. The deal was ultimately an overpay.
However, the Pistons were still contenders in 2006. They reached the 2007 Eastern Conference Finals, losing to LeBron James and the Cleveland Cavaliers. In the series-changing Game 5, James scored Cleveland`s final 25 points. Would that have happened with Wallace protecting the rim? It`s debatable, but this decision might have cost Detroit another Finals appearance and possibly a second Dumars-era championship.
To replace Wallace, the Pistons signed Nazr Mohammed for the full mid-level exception: five years and $30 million. They traded him midway through his second season. They reached the Eastern Conference Finals again in 2008, but this marked the beginning of their decline, accompanied by coaching changes.
Dumars` Coaching Hires Post-2004
Losing Larry Brown in 2005 was predictable, as he rarely stays long. Hiring Flip Saunders as his replacement was mostly successful. Saunders went 176-70 in three seasons and reached the Eastern Conference Finals each time. Had Wallace stayed, they might have reached the Finals in 2007. However, Saunders was fired after the third consecutive Eastern Conference Finals loss in 2008. This is where things deteriorated.
Michael Curry was promoted from Saunders` bench to head coach. He went 39-43 due to the Iverson trade and was fired after one year. John Kuester, a journeyman assistant who worked on Brown`s 2004 bench, replaced him. Kuester went 57-107 in two years, but that doesn`t fully capture his tenure.
Before the 2011 All-Star break, Pistons players reportedly planned a boycott of a shootaround as a mutiny against Kuester. They called it off, supposedly because Kuester would be fired during the break, but he wasn`t. Later in February, they boycotted another shootaround. When Kuester was ejected that night, Pistons players were seen laughing on the bench.
The Kuester era soon ended, but things didn`t improve. Lawrence Frank went 54-94 in two seasons. Mo Cheeks lasted only 50 games after replacing Frank, going 21-29 before being fired. Dumars resigned at the end of the 2013-14 season. In the ten years after the 2004 championship, the Pistons were 409-395, just above .500. He hasn`t been an NBA general manager since.
Dumars Post-Detroit
We`ve focused on Dumars` Pistons tenure. Now, we`ll discuss reports and speculation. Dumars didn`t immediately take a role with another team after leaving Detroit, but reports linked him to the New Orleans Pelicans.
In 2014, Dumars attended New Orleans Saints games with Mickey Loomis, their chief football decision-maker. Both teams are owned by the Benson family, and until 2019, Loomis oversaw Pelicans basketball operations, delegating daily duties to his general manager. In May 2015, reports suggested Dumars might take a supervisory role over then-general manager Dell Demps. No official title materialized. However, reports indicated Dumars, a Louisiana native, was advising the team and close to Loomis and owner Tom Benson.
Dumars` influence in New Orleans remained unclear, and rumors fluctuated. In April 2016, reports indicated no formal job offer discussions between Dumars and the Pelicans. A year later, hints suggested Pelicans changes and Dumars` long-standing connection to the team. It was a persistent but unconfirmed rumor.
Here`s what we know: Dell Demps officially led the New Orleans front office then, with limited success. From 2014-15 to 2018-19, the Pelicans made the playoffs twice and won one series. This era ended with Anthony Davis forcing a trade. During this time, the Pelicans prioritized immediate wins with Davis, making only one first-round pick between 2014 and 2018: Buddy Hield, traded in the DeMarcus Cousins deal.
In February 2019, the Pelicans fired Demps. Danny Ferry became interim general manager, not Dumars. In April, David Griffin was hired. Two months later, in June, Dumars joined the Sacramento Kings, his first official position since Detroit.
Little is known about Dumars` time with the Kings, as his influence is uncertain. He remained in Sacramento under two lead executives, Vlade Divac and Monte McNair, holding various titles from 2019 to 2022. Sacramento didn`t make the playoffs, and their notable move was drafting and trading Tyrese Haliburton.
While Dumars` influence in Sacramento is unclear, the Kings were an unusual choice for career rehabilitation. Basketball figures often join successful teams after being fired to rebuild their image and learn from top minds. The Kings lacked that reputation. After Sacramento, Dumars joined the league office as head of basketball operations.
So… What Are the Pelicans Thinking?
We`ve discussed many negatives. In fairness, early Dumars, before and up to the 2004 championship, was a great general manager. His construction of that title team, unique for lacking a true superstar, was unconventional.
The 2004 Pistons core was built by Dumars identifying winning players in losing situations. Chauncey Billups is an example. A No. 5 pick in 1997, talented but traded early in his rookie season and played for four teams in five years. Point guards need development and stability. The league mostly gave up on Billups. Dumars saw opportunity and seized it.
Rip Hamilton broke out in his second NBA season, but in his third, played with Michael Jordan in Washington. He handled it well, but it overshadowed his growing value. Jerry Stackhouse, a two-time All-Star and former scoring champion, was declining. Dumars traded the proven player for the ascending one. Stackhouse never became an All-Star again; Hamilton became a key Piston.
Ben Wallace was acquired opportunistically. When Grant Hill became a free agent in 2000, he could have left Detroit for nothing. Instead, he agreed to a sign-and-trade sending Wallace to the Pistons. Had Hill left outright, or if Orlando structured the contract differently, Wallace would have stayed. Dumars turned a potential loss into a major gain creatively and quickly.
Even drafting Miličić, though it failed, was a high-upside risk based on league trends. Dirk Nowitzki and Pau Gasol were recent European lottery successes outside the American college system. There was a belief in a new wave of foreign stars, which proved true. Dumars tried to capitalize on this wave, failing because the player wasn`t good enough, but it showed his early creative and adaptable approach.
Around the 2004 championship, this changed. The Pistons stagnated. From 2008 to 2014, they never ranked above 22nd in 3-point attempts. They drafted big men who needed post touches and played them together as the league moved away from post play. While other teams saved cap space for stars, the Pistons spent on middling role players. Early drafting misses were masked by successful trades. As the core aged, Dumars didn`t find new gems, and drafting became a problem.
This happens in sports. As we learn more, they change faster. There`s been a concerted effort to use data to find what leads to winning. This causes turnover among executives clinging to outdated strategies. “Adapt or die,” as Billy Beane said in Moneyball.
But it`s a human endeavor. Decisions are made by humans. Those in power due to wealth, not sports history, can be swayed by past success, even if irrelevant now. Dumars has a championship ring. The Pelicans could interview many smart, upcoming basketball minds, but most lack that ring.
We`ve seen similar stories in other sports, often ending poorly. Jon Gruden, a great coach in the late 90s and early 2000s, had a bad end with Tampa Bay, then a decade out of coaching. The Raiders brought him back in 2018, giving him personnel control. He went 22-31 and was fired for off-field conduct, but his decisions were often criticized. The Chicago White Sox hired Tony La Russa in 2021, 10 years after his retirement from St. Louis. They performed similarly in his first season and then .500 in his second. Consensus was the game had passed him by, and he faced backlash for criticizing a player for a 3-0 count home run.
These situations are unique but relationship-driven. Mark Davis hired Gruden because his father employed him earlier. Jerry Reinsdorf hired La Russa in 2015, regretting firing him in 1986. Human decisions aren`t always rational. Fixing old mistakes can lead to new ones.
We don`t know Dumars` Pelicans relationship before Monday`s news, but reports suggest one. Dumars taking the Kings job two months after Griffin`s Pelicans hire, five years after leaving Detroit, is curious. Perhaps he was a candidate then. Maybe the Pelicans regret not considering him more seriously during Griffin`s hiring.
This is speculation, as is predicting GM performance. But the hire is important, so evaluating their criteria is worthwhile. We can`t definitively say Dumars` influence in New Orleans last decade, but we can note his recent track record, and that any track record becomes less relevant over time.
There`s a big difference between hiring a recent champion and a distant one. The Pelicans hire a GM for 2025 and beyond. Joe Dumars hasn`t been an effective GM since 2004. Could he have learned from Detroit mistakes and improved? Maybe.
But there`s a reason no other team has bet on him in 11 years. Hires like this are rare now. Modern NBA understands a great team 20 years ago isn`t today`s qualification. GMs can be fired two years after a title. What does it say about a GM without success for over 20 years?
Jasper Hawthorne