Stephen Curry doesn`t have many chances left to secure a fifth championship, a fact the Golden State Warriors fully grasp. This understanding influenced every decision made during the 2024-25 season. When reports emerged at the trade deadline that the Warriors were `legitimately calling about every All-Star player,` it stemmed from recognizing the limited time remaining in the prime of the 37-year-old Curry. Finding another player of his caliber could take decades for Golden State, so the organization is fully committed to capitalizing on the present. This urgency was the basis for their trade acquisition of Jimmy Butler.
The on-court improvements were quickly evident. The Warriors held a 25-26 record before Butler`s arrival and finished the season 23-8 with him on the roster. Beyond his performance, a key benefit was his manageable cost. He only required a 2025 first-round pick, preserving their future selections from Stepien Rule limitations. Andrew Wiggins was the sole core player involved in the transaction. The hope was that Butler alone would be enough to elevate the Warriors into genuine championship contention. The unspoken reality, however, was that if they quickly discovered he wasn`t sufficient, they still retained the assets for another major move.
This context makes Curry`s second-round hamstring strain in their five-game series loss to the Wolves particularly damaging for the Warriors. It represents more than just a missed opportunity for that coveted fifth title; it`s a lost chance to accurately gauge how far away they truly are from it. This playoff run was intended as a crucial measuring stick. It nearly served that purpose. Had the Warriors lost Game 7 to the Houston Rockets, the answer would have been clear: more help was undeniably needed.
But how does a second-round exit, where Curry played only 13 minutes before disappearing, provide any clarity? Golden State performed well during that brief period with Curry, but it`s far from a reliable sample size. What does it indicate about Butler`s ability that he couldn`t keep the team competitive long enough for Curry`s return? Can anything be confidently concluded from Butler`s postseason performance following the injury he sustained against Houston? And what about the supporting cast, whose roles are primarily defined by their fit alongside Curry and Butler? Is it too early to judge Brandin Podziemski`s capacity to generate offense in the postseason? Do Jonathan Kuminga`s flashes of potential warrant a new contract, or do they perhaps make him a more attractive sign-and-trade candidate? Or did he simply benefit from a rare opportunity to contribute significantly when the primary offensive engine was absent?
With certainty, we can currently say that the 2024-25 Warriors, in a playoff setting, were relatively comparable to the 2024-25 Rockets, perhaps holding a slight edge. However, this comparison means little for 2026 and beyond. This version of the Rockets is likely as weak as they will ever be. The same can probably be said for the Thunder. Both are among the NBA`s youngest teams. Even if the Warriors could compete with them this season, they would need to improve significantly just to keep pace next year. The Warriors, as currently constructed, are likely trending downwards. Kuminga`s development hasn`t fully materialized, and given his expected salary demands alone, his departure seems probable. Podziemski is a valuable player, but the All-Star potential the team envisioned hasn`t yet appeared. Curry is 37, Butler will be 36 before next season, and Draymond Green is 35. The decline due to age is unlikely to be offset by internal youth development; improvement will almost certainly need to come from outside the organization.
If another deal similar to the Butler trade arises, bringing in a significant contributor at a reasonable cost, by all means, they should take it. But such deals are infrequent. There`s a reason it took the Warriors nearly a year to find one like Butler. More realistically, a major acquisition would necessitate dismantling part of the existing core. With Kuminga, Kevon Looney, and Gary Payton II potentially entering free agency, the available salary matching options are limited. Aside from Curry, Butler, and Green, the Warriors have less than $31 million in total salary committed for next season. Combining these salaries might allow them to target a high-end starter, but $30 million-level difference-makers are rare, and those who exist are seldom available. They could attempt creative sign-and-trades, but these come with numerous CBA-related restrictions. Furthermore, Steve Kerr`s coaching philosophy emphasizes `strength in numbers,` making him reluctant to sacrifice depth for just any player.
This brings us to acknowledge that the best player potentially becoming available this offseason isn`t just “anyone.” The Warriors have been linked to Giannis Antetokounmpo since at least May 2020, when a report indicated that, according to a league source, `the Warriors have been preparing for years to make a bid for Antetokounmpo.` Half a decade later, Antetokounmpo remains equally enticing. The theoretical fit with Curry is clear.
Curry is fundamentally different from Damian Lillard. There`s no obvious concern about their fit with Antetokounmpo because their offense wouldn`t need to heavily rely on pick-and-roll chemistry. Curry is primarily an off-ball threat. No player has ever possessed greater 3-point gravity. Similarly, no modern player commands more rim gravity than Antetokounmpo. Their simultaneous presence on the court effectively dismantles opposing defenses. For years, the Warriors attempted, and largely failed, to replicate even a fraction of what Antetokounmpo could provide. They used high lottery picks on Kuminga and James Wiseman, desperate to find a vertical spacer or downhill driver who could alleviate Curry`s offensive burden. Antetokounmpo represents the ultimate solution.
Now, Antetokounmpo finds himself on a Milwaukee Bucks team that appears to be declining rapidly. While he hasn`t reportedly requested a trade yet, sources suggest he is `open-minded about exploring whether his best long-term fit is remaining in Milwaukee or playing elsewhere.` One source, as reported, indicated that potential destinations might be limited to `the big cities: One of the L.A. teams or one of the New York teams or maybe Miami, not a big market, but a glamour market, mid-size market.` Other reports also mentioned Miami and Brooklyn as possible preferred locations. San Francisco would logically be included in this mix.
Could the Warriors offer enough for Giannis?
In reality, the answer is closer to `yes` than it might appear on paper. Golden State doesn`t possess the most attractive package of assets. They could never outbid teams like the Thunder, Rockets, Nets, or several others. The recent NBA Draft lottery results made it harder, with the San Antonio Spurs jumping to No. 2, adding another prime asset to their potential trade pool. In a straightforward bidding war based purely on assets, the Warriors would likely lose.
However, consider the 2019 trade for Anthony Davis, another long-term target for the Warriors. Davis desired to play with LeBron James, so despite other teams offering more assets, he ultimately landed with the Lakers. This scenario is common; players, at minimum, have significant input, which can evolve into decision-making power if they are willing to create discomfort. If Antetokounmpo had his choice, where might he end up?
The Warriors would likely rank high on that list. He and Curry share deep mutual respect. In 2018, when Curry was an All-Star captain, he drafted Antetokounmpo. A year later, Antetokounmpo returned the gesture by selecting Curry first as captain. After Curry won the championship in 2022, Antetokounmpo called him the best player in the world. Curry responded by saying, `I was thinking the same thing about him last year,` referencing Antetokounmpo`s championship season.
While this mutual admiration doesn`t guarantee a trade, the James-Davis partnership offers a rare insight into how players often approach these situations. They typically aren`t meticulously analyzing team rosters, evaluating asset bases, and mapping out cap situations years in advance. Their primary focus is usually finding the best possible teammate *in the moment* and ideally playing in an appealing city. That description fits Golden State well.
What would Warriors give up for Giannis?
The concise answer is `anything except Curry.` If the Bucks want Podziemski, he`s available. A Kuminga sign-and-trade is complex from a salary cap standpoint but generally feasible when the stakes are high enough. Don`t underestimate Golden State`s draft picks. They owe a top-20 protected pick in 2030 to the Wizards, but this doesn`t significantly hinder them as they can still trade the potentially more valuable unprotected portion of that pick. All their other draft picks post-2025 are tradeable, and acquiring deep future Warriors picks could be highly advantageous right now. By 2032, Curry will be 44 and retired, and Antetokounmpo, at 37, might also be finished playing.
These future picks hold tremendous value and could easily be leveraged by Milwaukee. Don`t want to wait seven years for a top prospect? No problem. The Pelicans control Milwaukee`s 2026 pick outright and hold their 2027 pick if it falls within the top four. The Bucks could reach out to New Orleans and offer some of that Warriors capital in exchange for the right to control their own draft future again, similar to how the Nets regained control from the Rockets last summer.
Before proceeding, a financial reality must be acknowledged. To match Antetokounmpo`s salary (over $54 million next season), the Warriors would almost certainly need to include Butler ($48.8 million). If, by some miracle, they avoided including Butler, it would mean including Green ($26.7 million) plus almost every other player on the roster. Aside from Curry and Butler, all other Warriors under contract for next season combine for only $56.8 million. This implies they either form a three-star core with Curry, Butler, and Antetokounmpo but with very limited depth, or they trade Butler just months after acquiring him if they pursue Antetokounmpo.
For several reasons, the Bucks would almost certainly not be interested in acquiring Butler or Green directly. If they trade Antetokounmpo, even without regaining control of all their picks, their likely goal would be to get younger and reduce salary. Butler and Green are older and expensive. Butler has also repeatedly shown himself to be an exceptionally difficult personality within the locker room when dissatisfied, and while Green has never changed teams, he isn`t known for fostering organizational harmony. The probability is high that neither would be content playing in Milwaukee.
However, Butler did sign an extension upon being traded to the Warriors, giving him two years remaining on his deal and financial security. Green is also locked in for multiple years. The Warriors would therefore only need to find an interested third party that Butler or Green would consider an acceptable basketball destination. Is this feasible? Possibly. Butler had a strong few months in Golden State, which might have boosted his trade value compared to his time with the Heat. Green`s value is heavily linked to Curry, making moving him potentially harder. While a few teams would covet the best defensive player in the NBA outside of Victor Wembanyama and his contract is manageable, his trade value would fluctuate significantly depending on the team`s willingness to utilize his offensive skills outside of Curry`s system.
The potential model for this trade, ironically, could be the deal Milwaukee made to acquire Lillard. The Bucks sent Portland all their available draft capital, but that wasn`t sufficient, so they also included Jrue Holiday, understanding he could later be flipped for additional assets. A similar strategy would likely be Golden State`s path: offering everything of value they can, plus Butler or Green, who would then be traded by Milwaukee to a third team for further assets.
Part of the reason the Lillard trade was structured that way was to prevent Holiday from learning about negotiations before they were finalized, avoiding locker room disruption if he were to remain. The Warriors would face a similar risk shopping Butler or Green to acquire Antetokounmpo. Could they keep these discussions as secret as the Bucks largely did in 2023? It would likely be much more difficult. Antetokounmpo is a more prominent figure than Lillard, attracting more potential suitors, leading to increased likelihood of leaks. Rival teams would relish the opportunity to destabilize Golden State. If the Warriors perceive the acquisition as unlikely for any reason, this potential for disruption might be enough to deter them from the pursuit altogether.
If they pull it off, would it be worth it?
This is arguably the most challenging question. The new CBA heavily penalizes teams operating above the second apron, placing an overwhelming emphasis on roster depth. Superteams are not currently the dominant model. The Lakers were eliminated in five games by the Timberwolves. The Clippers lost to the Nuggets partly because their defensively focused role players could be ignored on offense. Even the Warriors struggled significantly against the Rockets because they couldn`t identify reliable players to pair with Curry, Green, and Butler, while Houston`s backup center nearly bullied them out of the playoffs.
In a best-case scenario, trading for Antetokounmpo would hard cap the Warriors at the second apron. Perhaps they could retain a few useful supporting players, particularly in a trade package that includes Butler`s larger salary rather than Green`s smaller one. Buddy Hield`s shooting would be beneficial. They might be able to re-sign Payton. Keeping Moses Moody would help, but he`s one of the younger Warriors Milwaukee might actually want. However, these are players who, for various reasons, struggled at points in the postseason. They aren`t the seamless plug-and-play role players found on teams like Oklahoma City or Minnesota. Golden State would likely require major minutes from role players opponents don`t guard or from defensive liabilities susceptible to being attacked.
If you subscribe to the idea that the regular season highlights strengths while the postseason exposes weaknesses, the Warriors would be highly exploitable at the highest levels. This isn`t 2016. They wouldn`t have four All-Stars, nor contributors like Andre Iguodala and Shaun Livingston coming off the bench. While they`d still be appealing for minimum-salary free agents, a revitalized Lakers team would offer more significant competition on that front than any team in the previous decade. Access to the buyout market would be restricted if they finished above the first apron, which would be almost certain. Golden State would need to achieve near-perfection on the margins of their roster construction.
The Warriors have pursued stars before, but never under these specific circumstances. They`ve never had to grapple with the fundamental conflict between acquiring top-tier star power and maintaining a functional, deep roster. This situation creates an irresolvable tension between two core organizational principles. As mentioned, Kerr believes in `strength in numbers,` trusting many players and using deep rotations even late in the playoffs. Yet, in moments of crisis, the front office led by Joe Lacob has consistently aimed high. They didn`t draft safer, easy fits like Tyrese Haliburton or Franz Wagner during their low point at the turn of the decade; they took high-upside swings on players like Wiseman and Kuminga. They didn`t re-sign Harrison Barnes and keep Andrew Bogut after losing the 2016 NBA Finals; they signed Kevin Durant. They didn`t trade for a marginal upgrade like Nikola Vučević at this year`s deadline; they traded for a star in Butler.
Now, they stand at another critical juncture, approaching it without clear vision. Curry is under contract for two more years, as are Butler and Green. Yet, they lack definitive knowledge of whether this version of their team had the capability to withstand the four-round playoff grind or even come close. Seriously pursuing Antetokounmpo would effectively mean dismantling their current team, a team whose true potential they haven`t been able to fully assess. Losing Curry to injury denied them the opportunity to answer that crucial question. Consequently, they will have to make a pivotal decision based on speculation and hope for the best possible outcome.