Thunder coaching strategy backfires horribly in Game 1 vs. Nuggets, but was Mark Daigenault wrong?

Shai Gilgeous-Alexander`s two free throws with 13.2 seconds left in Game 1 against the Denver Nuggets served a dual purpose. Initially, they put the Oklahoma City Thunder ahead 117-114. More significantly, however, they presented head coach Mark Daigneault with a critical strategic choice.

The Nuggets were down by three points and needed a three-pointer to tie. Interestingly, Denver takes the fewest three-pointers in the league. Conversely, the Thunder boasted the NBA`s top defense in the regular season, limiting opponents to a league-low 34.2% from beyond the arc. Logic suggested that if the best three-point defense could deny the league`s least frequent three-point shooting team a single make in the final seconds, the Thunder would secure a 1-0 series lead.

Evidently, Daigneault wasn`t confident enough in those odds. Instead of letting the Nuggets attempt a tying three, he opted to intentionally foul. This led to a bizarre and crucial series of events.

• With 12.2 seconds remaining, Alex Caruso fouled Nikola Jokić. Jokić made both free throws, narrowing the score to 117-116 Thunder. The Thunder called a timeout.
• With 11 seconds remaining, Gilgeous-Alexander broke away from Denver`s defense for an easy dunk following an inbound play after the timeout. This extended the Thunder`s lead to 119-116.
• With 10.1 seconds remaining, Caruso fouled Aaron Gordon. This was particularly significant for two reasons. Firstly, Jokić had been substituted out before Gilgeous-Alexander`s dunk due to having five fouls; the Nuggets couldn`t risk him intentionally fouling to stop the previous play and picking up a sixth. Secondly, the Nuggets lacked a timeout. They had intended to re-insert Jokić during Oklahoma City`s anticipated free throws, but because Gilgeous-Alexander dunked instead of getting fouled, they had no immediate way to get him back on the court. Thus, had the Thunder not fouled, Denver would have had 10 seconds to generate a three-point attempt without Jokić orchestrating the possession. Instead, Jokić returned to the floor, and Gordon sank both his free throws, cutting the Thunder`s lead to 119-118.
• With 9.1 seconds remaining, Russell Westbrook fouled Chet Holmgren. Holmgren missed both free throws. At this point, the Nuggets no longer needed a three-pointer to tie. Christian Braun then passed the ball to Westbrook near mid-court. Fearing a fast break layup or drive leading to free throws, the two primary Thunder defenders in the play, Holmgren and Jalen Williams, focused on Westbrook. However, Westbrook passed to Gordon, who drilled a game-winning three-pointer with 2.8 seconds left.

This sequence is complex. Daigneault later defended his decision, noting that fouling while up three is the team`s established strategy, practiced throughout the season. He stated, “It`s tough to switch the strategy… They executed it like I said,” taking responsibility.

Generally, intentionally fouling when holding a three-point lead is considered the statistically sound approach. The basic logic is that if the opponent needs three points, allowing only two points from free throws minimizes the risk of a tie, making it usually the correct tactical decision.

Had Chet Holmgren, an career 78% free-throw shooter, made both his free throws, leaving Denver needing to score three points without a timeout, the narrative around Daigneault`s strategy would likely be very different. It`s worth noting Aaron Gordon is a career 69.3% free-throw shooter. This highlights that the outcome was partly due to execution failure (Holmgren`s misses, Gordon`s makes) rather than just a flawed strategy itself.

However, crucial context must always be considered. The clock situation on Monday was paramount. While fouling is standard with only a couple of seconds left (as the opponent wouldn`t have time for another shot even after making free throws), the Thunder began fouling with 13.2 seconds remaining, leaving ample time for subsequent possessions.

The two intentional fouls occurred within just 2.1 seconds of each other, both with over 10 seconds still on the clock. This transformed a situation potentially ending in one play into one featuring five possessions in the final 13.2 seconds. Increased possessions introduce more variance, which benefits the team trailing and the underdog – both of which the Nuggets were on Monday. Even if Holmgren had sunk both free throws, the remaining time was sufficient that the Thunder would likely have needed to foul Denver one or two more times to secure the win via this method, creating numerous chances for things to go Denver`s way.

Regardless of strategic preference, adaptability is perhaps a coach`s most vital attribute. Daigneault, arguably, displayed tunnel vision. He failed to adjust despite circumstances offering Denver a potential final possession without Nikola Jokić on the court. During the regular season, the Nuggets shot 39.6% from three with Jokić playing, but only 34% when he was off. Missing the opportunity to face a Jokić-less final play was likely the sequence`s most significant error.

However, even analyzing the entire 13.2-second span prompts questioning whether Daigneault`s apprehension about a potential three-pointer was warranted, given the game`s specific context:

• Denver shot 31.3% from deep in Game 1. Gordon`s winner aside, the Nuggets weren`t exactly red-hot from three in this particular game.
• Even if the Thunder were determined not to foul, the Nuggets wouldn`t have known this. Denver would have had to operate offensively as if a foul was still possible, likely rushing the first somewhat open three-pointer they could get, regardless of shooter or quality. In this scenario, the resulting three attempt would probably have been a poor one.
• There were 13.2 seconds left when the intentional fouling began. It`s hard to believe the Nuggets could have methodically used up all that time from a desperate position. If they had taken the first available three, it would likely have come with five or six seconds remaining. Therefore, even if it was successful, the Thunder could have called a timeout and designed their own attempt at a game-winner on the other end. With a presumptive MVP like Gilgeous-Alexander, they could have felt reasonably confident about scoring on that hypothetical last possession.
• Consider the possibility of overtime. The Nuggets had just played a Game 7 two days prior, while the Thunder had swept their first-round series and were significantly more rested. Furthermore, six players logged at least 40 minutes in this game, with Jamal Murray (44) and Jokić (42) leading. Braun and Gilgeous-Alexander played 40, while Gordon and Williams played 39. The Thunder were fresher within the game itself and, given their depth, could utilize relatively fresh reserves, whereas Denver has primarily relied on its starters and Westbrook this postseason. Adding to this, the Thunder were playing at home. The odds, even if the game had gone to overtime, were heavily stacked in their favor.

Evaluating such numerous variables in real-time underscores the difficulty of coaching. Ironically, Daigneault`s past success might have contributed to this outcome. The Thunder`s dominant regular season, marked by the second-best net rating in NBA history and frequent blowouts, resulted in them playing only 24 clutch games (the fewest in the league). This lack of experience manifested not only in the players` late-game collapse but also arguably in Daigneault`s decision-making in the final seconds. In only his second postseason and with limited regular-season practice in tight finishes, he appeared to adhere to a statistical strategy rather than fully considering the immediate game context. While this might serve as a crucial learning opportunity for his future, in the short term, it likely cost the Thunder Game 1.