Sun. Sep 7th, 2025

The Western Conference Arms Race: Grading Every Team’s NBA Offseason

The script for the NBA offseason often feels repetitive: the Eastern Conference is perceived as vulnerable, while the Western Conference remains a relentless battleground, an escalating arms race among teams vying for supremacy. For a quarter-century, from the dynasties of the Lakers and Spurs to the Warriors and now the ascent of the Oklahoma City Thunder, the West has been defined by its depth and intensity. It is, and has always been, a bloodbath.

After the maturing Thunder captured their first championship in June, few rivals in the West appear content to yield. The conference`s upper echelon is demonstrably stronger than last year, and even teams in the middle have improved. Only the Utah Jazz seem truly committed to a full rebuild via tanking. Even the New Orleans Pelicans, who finished with one of the league`s worst records last season, are trading unprotected draft picks. The prevailing sentiment across the conference is a fierce desire to win, and many of these teams could realistically contend for a title if they were geographically located closer to the Atlantic.

Conference alignment is beyond their control, but offseason roster decisions were not. Every front office in the West understood the fundamental task: position yourself to challenge the Thunder, either immediately or in the future. We are grading each Western Conference team`s offseason largely based on this metric. Did they take meaningful steps towards challenging the new standard? The teams that did receive favorable marks. Those who did not, well, their evaluations appear further down the list.

Rockets: A+

Houston orchestrated what can only be described as a practically flawless offseason. They functionally upgraded three key positions without sacrificing substantial assets or flexibility. Consider the key changes:

  • Kevin Durant, one of the game`s all-time great scorers, replaces Jalen Green. Green`s shooting last season was below Durant`s post-rookie career lows in several categories. Durant`s playoff scoring record speaks for itself.
  • Dorian Finney-Smith comes in for Dillon Brooks. Finney-Smith is a slightly better career three-point shooter. Both are stout defenders, with mixed metrics favoring neither definitively. Finney-Smith is older but significantly cheaper over the next two seasons, with his contract beyond that being non-guaranteed.
  • Clint Capela takes over from Jock Landale at third center. Capela is a proven full-time starter; Landale has minimal starting experience and limited minutes.

The remaining roster foundation, aside from anticipated internal development from young players, remains the same. All the Rockets lost in these exchanges were Cam Whitmore, who struggled for minutes anyway, and the No. 10 overall pick, who likely would have faced similar playing time challenges given the situation with former No. 3 pick Reed Sheppard last year. General Manager Rafael Stone paid virtually nothing significant to achieve substantial improvement. He even persuaded Fred VanVleet to accept a salary roughly half his previous one.

Houston retains immense flexibility. They can patiently develop their young core, or they can pursue another star trade using their assets. The roster is deep enough to withstand almost any injury not involving Durant. Capela provides essential depth to keep Steven Adams fresh for the playoffs. Sheppard, a top-three pick, faces minimal pressure. This roster boasts top-end talent, remarkable depth, and complete flexibility. Keep crushing it, Houston.

Nuggets: A-

Trading an unprotected 2032 first-round pick to Brooklyn was not a decision made lightly. That pick conveys when Nikola Jokić will be 37. However, it was necessary. Denver`s championship window with Jokić is now, and such opportunities might not return for half a century. They must maximize this era, and they have done so this offseason.

Cam Johnson may be a slightly better player than Michael Porter Jr. in isolation, offering needed off-dribble creation and better defense alongside similar shooting. But the $17 million salary difference was key, opening significant doors for Denver. They immediately used some of that cap flexibility to acquire Jonas Valančiūnas, arguably the best backup center of the Jokić era – a position that has historically been a problem area.

Even if Valančiūnas were to pursue playing in Europe (which Denver seems unlikely to allow), the trade had other benefits. It shed Dario Šarić`s practically dead money contract. Valančiūnas`s situation could even make him a valuable trade asset; another team needing salary relief could trade for him and potentially buy him out. This could potentially be a creative way out of Zeke Nnaji`s cumbersome contract, aggregating the two to acquire a ~$20 million player, with the acquiring team saving money via a buyout.

Denver also excelled in the minimum market, bringing back former champion Bruce Brown and adding Tim Hardaway Jr., precisely the type of bench shooter the team that took the fewest threes last season desperately needed. They are now in an advantageous position, straddling the luxury tax line. They could potentially duck it entirely in-season without significantly worsening, which offers long-term benefits. However, they still possess their full mid-level exception, allowing them to make significant upgrades on the trade or buyout market if the right opportunity arises, potentially pushing them up to the first apron. Denver is better than last year, with room to improve further. Frankly, if they do duck the tax, they`ve earned it.

Clippers: B

Grading the Clippers is complex due to the widely anticipated, though not yet finalized, addition of Bradley Beal for minimal cost. Beal is roughly a $20 million player at this career stage, a disaster at his previous $50 million salary but an enormous bargain at the ~$5 million left on their mid-level exception. This grade attempts to split that difference; they move closer to a `B+` with Beal and `B-` without.

Regardless of the Beal outcome, their offseason has been successful. They addressed their primary weaknesses: backup point guard and backup center. The latter was resolved comprehensively. Brook Lopez, while not a starter, is a valuable backup whose shooting complements a roster with many defensively focused, offensively limited players (Kris Dunn, Derrick Jones Jr.). John Collins provides frontcourt versatility, potentially starting or backing up at power forward or even playing backup center. His athleticism offers a new dynamic, particularly in pick-and-roll with James Harden.

They lost Norman Powell in these exchanges, a player they reportedly did not plan to extend anyway. If Beal joins, their bench creation need is met. If not, they have Bogdan Bogdanović short-term and his salary for future trades. As the Jazz demonstrated by trading Collin Sexton for a past-prime Jusuf Nurkić (costing a second-round pick) and the Kings have shown trying to dump Malik Monk, small, offense-first guards are currently abundant. The Clippers can find another if needed. Improving this much while retaining paths to max cap space in 2026 or 2027 is a significant bonus. Criticized for potentially losing Paul George for nothing, that now looks like a stroke of genius.

Thunder: B

Nothing flashy, but what would you expect from a 68-win defending champion? The Thunder retained their core, ducked the tax, and performed routine maintenance on their already finely tuned machine. Fringe moves were smart: securing Jaylin Williams and Ajay Mitchell on three-year bargains via restricted free agency. Drafting Thomas Sorber was a forward-thinking move anticipating the potential loss of Isaiah Hartenstein next year. And of course, Nikola Topić will be healthy next season, adding another lottery-level talent. Sam Presti continues his methodical approach.

Spurs: B

As will be noted elsewhere, draft luck doesn`t constitute wise management. Drafting Dylan Harper was a gift from the lottery gods. However, San Antonio earned credit in other key areas. First, actual roster improvement. Luke Kornet and Kelly Olynyk aren`t stars, but they provide necessary frontcourt depth. Landing Carter Bryant, a prototypical 3-and-D prospect, at No. 14 was a genuine draft win. Crucially, they cleared out developmental “flotsam.” Malaki Branhams and Blake Wesleys are gone. Minutes will now go to legitimately good NBA players or high-upside prospects. The jump from `bad` to `good`, which San Antonio targets this season, often happens when a team stops allocating minutes to undeserving players.

Second, and equally important, was the wise decision *not* to trade for Kevin Durant. While Durant improves any team, Houston`s legitimate 2026 championship aspirations weren`t shared by San Antonio. The Spurs are too young, lack playoff experience, and waiting for a potentially “bigger, younger, Greek-er fish” made more strategic sense. This was wise restraint. They don`t need to contend yet; their window is long if they manage the next few years correctly. This summer was a positive first step, improving the team without sacrificing crucial future assets.

Grizzlies: B-

The Desmond Bane trade appears to be a win-win. Orlando credibly believed Bane was a crucial piece for Eastern Conference contention. The Grizzlies wisely acknowledged they were further away and secured a significant return. While opinions vary on the *quality* of the four first-round picks received, the *quantity* and unprotected nature are undeniable. Memphis immediately used one Orlando pick to move up to No. 11 for Cedric Coward, seemingly aiming to replicate Bane`s value through aggregate talent. Roughly half their roster now consists of promising young players (21-25) on affordable, team-controlled salaries – a good position while navigating a loaded West. Ty Jerome, underpaid based on one bad playoff series, was statistically the NBA`s best reserve on a per-minute basis last season.

The core question remains whether Ja Morant and Jaren Jackson Jr. can be the top two players on a high-level winner once they command max salaries. While some might argue for a full rebuild post-Bane trade, there`s a defensible counter-argument. Jackson is a former Defensive Player of the Year improving offensively; Morant has appeared on MVP ballots when healthy. Memphis now has the assets to trade for surrounding pieces if they go all-in, or they can develop their young core patiently. A slight concern is how much harder a rebuild becomes in a year or two if this core doesn`t succeed. Moving Morant presents well-documented difficulties. Jackson`s contract could become dangerous if they decide to move him later, similar to how Lauri Markkanen`s trade value on a max deal seems less robust now than when he was on a below-market contract a year ago. This isn`t a bad offseason, but it`s one where the team chose a different, albeit understandable, direction.

Jazz: C+

Despite any pre-draft process concerns, acquiring Ace Bailey`s combination of physical tools and basketball skills at No. 5 is exceptionally rare. While not a guarantee of NBA success, his player comparisons (Durant, Ingram, Porter Jr.) highlight the upside. Healthy, large wings with elite shot-making potential typically don`t fall to this spot.

Returns for the veterans they moved were underwhelming, raising questions about the process. Utah has seemingly prioritized perfection over good, reportedly avoiding trades deemed less than `home runs.` They could have moved Collin Sexton or Jordan Clarkson for positive value previously. Instead, they paid a second-round pick to swap Sexton for a worse player and bought out Clarkson. Financial savings from the John Collins trade offer flexibility, allowing them access to the trade facilitator or restricted free agency markets. However, Collins is on an expiring deal, limiting long-term savings.

Still, clearing out these veterans, however imperfectly, was smart to create minutes for young players. Few teams would be as brazen about tanking, which they badly needed to do. It wasn`t groundbreaking, but on balance, it was a good step.

Timberwolves: C

The Timberwolves` only new player to date is No. 17 pick Joan Beringer. His impact remains to be seen. Crucially, Minnesota`s moves for the 2025-26 season were largely made back in the 2024 draft when they traded up for Rob Dillingham and drafted Terrence Shannon Jr. They anticipated losing Nickeil Alexander-Walker this offseason, and returning to the second apron again this season wouldn`t have been fiscally responsible given their future draft obligations. They needed to prepare for Alexander-Walker`s likely departure in advance.

Without knowing Dillingham and Shannon Jr.`s readiness to fill Alexander-Walker`s void (and potentially cut into Mike Conley`s minutes), grading this offseason is difficult. It`s a `wait-and-see` situation. While some might advocate for more aggressive roster reshaping given the deficiencies exposed by the Thunder, the Timberwolves likely made their moves based on available opportunities. Tim Connelly is known for big swings; one is likely coming in the next year or two. Damian Lillard is an obvious potential target – Minnesota lacks a long-term starting point guard solution and has few other ways to acquire his level of talent given their financial constraints. Stealing him after a potential stretch, even if he missed a year, would be huge. For now, it`s an average grade, but trust the front office to seek improvement.

Suns: C-

Phoenix made some solid player acquisitions this offseason. Landing Khaman Maluach at No. 10 involved luck, but not lottery luck. Mark Williams represents the right type of risk given their asset limitations – a talented center option where they`ve had nothing for two years. Jalen Green, despite playoff struggles, offers athleticism that could pair well with Devin Booker`s scoring if he harnesses his rim-attacking potential.

It`s the financial maneuvering that`s perplexing. While Milwaukee waived-and-stretched Damian Lillard to acquire Myles Turner, Phoenix is reportedly doing the same with Bradley Beal primarily to duck the luxury tax and second apron. This creates significant future dead cap (around $20 million for five years) but doesn`t improve the team on the court. While ducking the tax resets their repeater clock and frees up their 2033 first-round pick sooner, it handcuffs them financially alongside Devin Booker`s supermax extension. Without draft picks or cap space, improvement pathways are limited. Some advocated trading Booker before the offseason, but his extension may have reduced his value, trapping the Suns in potential play-in purgatory. This offseason solidified a limited-upside era.

Lakers: C-

Similar to the Suns, the Lakers added good players – Deandre Ayton at a discount represents needed upside at center, and Jake LaRavia is a solid young addition. However, the vision and execution are questionable. Ayton`s contract structure is risky: if he`s poor, he opts in and clogs the books; if he breaks out, he opts out, and the Lakers lack Bird Rights, forcing them to use cap space, potentially hindering other moves and recreating risk from his last payday. There`s minimal long-term upside beyond potentially retaining Ayton at market value, which seems inconsistent with their fixation on 2027 cap space.

The Lakers don`t appear to be actively building towards a specific goal. They seem to be stalling, waiting for a star to demand a move to LA rather than proactively setting themselves up for improvement. This reflects a long-standing flaw in the front office. This lack of clear direction appears to be frustrating LeBron James, reportedly a reason for his discontent. Letting Dorian Finney-Smith walk, especially considering his contract structure in Houston aligned with the Lakers` 2027 timeline, is ironic. Their relationship with James, who resurrected the franchise post-Kobe, seems frayed – not a great look with Luka Dončić`s extension eligibility looming. Hopefully, ownership addresses this organizational instability before next summer, for Dončić`s sake.

Trail Blazers: C-

The Jrue Holiday trade simply didn`t make sense. Portland needed to move Anfernee Simons to create minutes for Scoot Henderson and Shaedon Sharpe, but acquiring a 35-year-old on a three-year, $100+ million contract wasn`t the answer. Holiday was already declining and the Blazers had perimeter defense covered. While mentorship is valuable, it`s not worth nine figures. Ironically, they might have gotten similar intangible benefits from Damian Lillard, who will likely be recovering in Portland anyway. The Yang Hansen pick feels like a front office reaching for a specific player, overdrafting him based on consensus, though acquiring an extra first-round pick by moving down from No. 11 to 16 softens the blow. The Ayton buyout made sense, clearing a redundant big and accessing the full mid-level exception, which can be used as a trade exception later. They desperately need shooting. The best development for Portland was something they didn`t control: Milwaukee`s desperation post-Lillard stretch, which enhances the value of the Bucks` first-round picks Portland controls from 2028-2030. The longer Giannis Antetokounmpo stays in Milwaukee, the better for Portland`s rebuild.

Mavericks: D+

As noted with the Spurs, lottery luck isn`t credit for good management. Dallas, arguably, made a historically bad trade only to be bailed out by perhaps the most stunning lottery outcome in NBA history (landing Cooper Flagg). This should have signaled a need for a fundamental change, potentially firing Nico Harrison and realigning around Flagg`s timeline. Instead, they doubled down, extending Daniel Gafford and retaining a surplus of size. The logical path was leveraging assets like Anthony Davis and other valuable role players to rebuild. This roster is profoundly unbalanced, overloaded with forwards and bigs. Why carry so much size if it doesn`t translate to elite defense? D`Angelo Russell was decent value, but he`s the only guard capable of consistent shot creation. Flagg appears slated to play out of position (starting at small forward, even experimenting at point). While potentially useful for development, it hinders immediate winning.

The irony of Harrison`s `defense wins championships` plan is the lack of a championship-caliber defense despite investing heavily in size. They lack the perimeter stopper needed for the Thunder. A win-now scenario requires improbable health and performance spikes. The more likely outcome is Kyrie Irving`s health limitations hindering contention, followed by age/injury decline dooming future attempts. By the time they acknowledge the mistake, rebuilding around Flagg on the fly years later will be significantly harder.

Kings: D

The “Bulls-West” jokes at the deadline were warranted, given the influx of former Chicago players. This summer, however, signifies a spiritual embodiment of the `all that matters is the No. 10 seed` ethos that has long defined Chicago. Building an offseason around acquiring Dennis Schröder, now on his 10th NBA team, as the starting point guard for a franchise that recently employed De`Aaron Fox and Tyrese Haliburton is profoundly disheartening for a deserving fanbase. Schröder is a below-average playmaker for a starter and prefers scoring, as do most players on the roster. They couldn`t move Malik Monk, Zach LaVine is an older, more expensive, injury-prone version of Monk, and DeMar DeRozan remains due to a limited market for a soon-to-be 36-year-old non-shooter/defender. Pursuing Jonathan Kuminga hits both the Chicago `buy high on former lottery picks` and Vivek Ranadive`s `pursue former Warriors` boxes. Who besides Keon Ellis plans to defend?

From a technical standpoint, retaining Keon Ellis by picking up his team option instead of declining it to make him a restricted free agent (as successful teams like the Thunder do to secure team-friendly, long-term deals) gives Ellis leverage next summer. If they don`t meet his price, they lose him for nothing. A team that has made the playoffs once in 19 seasons should emulate successful roster-building strategies. This was not that. Dallas has a flawed plan; the Kings appear to have ambition that doesn`t extend beyond the Play-In Tournament. A disappointing trajectory after recent promise.

Pelicans: F

Hiring Joe Dumars was a questionable move, and somehow that might have been an undersell. His first act was bringing in Troy Weaver, the architect of Detroit`s historic losing streak, as his top deputy. Their offseason moves have been an incomprehensible mess:

  • Taking on over $40 million in 2026-27 salary by swapping expiring contracts (C.J. McCollum, Kelly Olynyk) for Jordan Poole (dumped by Washington immediately) and Saddiq Bey (coming off a torn ACL).
  • Signing Kevon Looney to $16 million over two years, more than his minutes averaged last season, for a non-shooting center.
  • Using the No. 7 pick on Jeremiah Fears, roughly his draft range, but a guard who shot 28.4% from three last season.
  • Trading Indiana`s top-four protected 2026 first-round pick for the No. 23 pick *less than a week* before Tyrese Haliburton tore his Achilles – remarkably poor timing.
  • Packaging that No. 23 pick with their own unprotected 2026 first-round pick (with swap rights with Milwaukee) to move up to No. 13 for Maryland big man Derik Queen, who also doesn`t shoot threes.

The fixation on non-shooters is baffling given Zion Williamson remains on the roster. The ideal version of Williamson operates with the ball surrounded by shooters. The Pelicans have done the opposite, adding ball-stoppers who don`t space the floor. This suggests a plan to trade Williamson, except a team planning to give away its best player typically retains its own subsequent first-round pick. No matter the ultimate goal, the roster construction is incoherent. Furthermore, giving up arguably the single most valuable traded pick in basketball (their 2026 unprotected) to move up to No. 13 for Queen suggests desperation, yet failing to trade up further (to 8-12) risked losing him entirely. They couldn`t even execute their overpay correctly. Dumars and Weaver have inflicted significant damage on the roster and asset collection left by their predecessor in a single offseason.

Warriors: Incomplete

Golden State has yet to add a single player. Their plans appear dependent on resolving Jonathan Kuminga`s restricted free agency and potentially using him as a trade asset. They`ve been heavily linked to Al Horford, who seems a perfect fit given his shooting, passing, and surprisingly effective perimeter defense for his age. However, until a deal is finalized, grading their offseason is premature. The delay likely stems from needing Kuminga`s contractual situation settled to manage finances (avoiding luxury tax or first apron). We`ll revisit the Warriors once there`s clarity. Conceptually, adding Horford while gaining assets for Kuminga makes sense. If they execute this plan, it would be a positive step.

By Dominic Ashworth

Dominic Ashworth, 41, has made his mark in Leicester's sports media scene with his comprehensive coverage of football and horse racing. Known for his ability to spot emerging talents, Dominic spends countless hours at local sporting events, developing stories that matter to both casual fans and dedicated enthusiasts.

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