Less than a minute into the second-round series between the New York Knicks and the Boston Celtics, it became clear why coach Tom Thibodeau had opted for a heavy dose of defensive switching. Early in the possession, Mikal Bridges of the Knicks initially guarded Derrick White, then quickly switched to Jayson Tatum, and finally ended up defending Kristaps Porzingis. Despite the size mismatch and Porzingis establishing position inside, Bridges managed to block his shot at the rim.
This strategy didn`t necessarily put the Knicks at an immediate disadvantage, other than the considerable eight-inch height difference Porzingis held over Bridges. It allowed them to avoid doubling the ball-handler and reduced the need for complex, exhausting rotations across the court.
This defensive approach mirrored how the Orlando Magic guarded the Boston Celtics in the first round. Orlando was determined to limit Boston`s three-point attempts, and they were successful in that specific goal, allowing the Celtics to attempt an average of just 34.4 threes per 100 possessions, a significant drop from their regular-season average of 49.6 per 100. In the first half of Game 5 against the Magic, Boston even attempted only six threes and failed to make any. However, Boston still won that game comfortably by 31 points and maintained an impressive offensive rating of 120 points per 100 possessions in meaningful minutes throughout the series, nearly matching their regular-season efficiency of 120.9 per 100, according to Cleaning The Glass.
The defending champions force opposing teams to choose their preferred tactical challenge. In their last two playoff series, opponents have evidently decided to accept the risk of unfavorable matchups, with big players defending guards and vice versa, viewing it as the lesser of evils against Boston`s potent offense.
“When you look at five-out spacing and the ability for them to shoot 3s — but not only shoot 3s, but to get to the offensive boards and then kick out and create more 3s — it`s a challenge,” Thibodeau acknowledged to reporters on Tuesday.
Unlike Orlando, however, the Knicks did *not* manage to limit the Celtics` three-point volume on Monday. Boston attempted a high number of threes, launching 60 shots from beyond the arc, and were fortunate for New York that they only converted 15 of them. For instance, after Bridges` early block on Porzingis, Porzingis secured the offensive rebound and found Derrick White open for a corner three, which White missed.
The takeaway is that while the Knicks won the series opener – a game where they frequently switched Karl-Anthony Towns onto smaller players and even occasionally had Jalen Brunson guarding Boston`s stars – their victory was *not* primarily a result of this switching strategy. The strategy might have seemed surprising because New York`s defensive personnel doesn`t perfectly match Orlando`s in terms of universal switchability. While players like Bridges, OG Anunoby, and Josh Hart are capable of defending multiple positions, it`s a significantly greater challenge to consistently ask players like Towns or Brunson to guard elite scorers like Tatum and Jaylen Brown without help.
For the vast majority of Game 1, Boston managed to generate clean, open looks with relative ease. They specifically targeted matchups involving Towns and Brunson, and on multiple possessions, designed actions that involved both players defensively. The Knicks surrendered open three-pointers due to the mismatches created by the switches, delayed defensive rotations, and instances of poor execution of the switch itself.
According to NBA.com statistics, the Celtics shot poorly on open looks in Game 1, hitting just 7 of 24 wide-open threes (closest defender 6+ feet away) and 7 of 32 open threes (closest defender 4-6 feet away). They were also only 8 of 29 on catch-and-shoot threes, which are precisely the type of shots a switching defense is theoretically meant to prevent. Boston attempted 29.3 catch-and-shoot threes per 100 possessions, a higher rate than they did against Orlando (20.8 per 100) and close to their regular-season frequency (31.6 per 100).
“We know we`re going to have to be even more locked in next game and try to limit their 3s,” Josh Hart told reporters on Tuesday. “They`re a great shooting team. A lot of the shots that they shot, they`re comfortable with. Even on the mismatches on some of the switches on the perimeter, those guys are comfortable shooting the ball off the dribble and from deep. We gotta make sure we continue to just guard our yard and have each other`s back.”
Allowing Boston to repeatedly attack favorable defensive matchups is essentially playing with fire. Karl-Anthony Towns, for example, picked up two fouls guarding Tatum on switches within the first five minutes of Game 1 and another early in the second quarter while defending Brown on a switch. However, thanks to an unusually poor shooting performance from the Celtics and an uncharacteristic number of minor errors, Boston failed to consistently capitalize on these defensive opportunities. If the Knicks continue to rely on this switching scheme without significant adjustments or improved execution, they are likely to face severe consequences very soon.
Jasper Hawthorne