While the Indiana Pacers didn`t ultimately claim the NBA championship, their journey brought them much closer than anyone could have reasonably anticipated. They were just the sixth team seeded fourth to reach the Finals, yet they bore little resemblance to previous squads with that seeding. The 1969 Celtics predated the merger, and the 1978 Sonics followed soon after. The 2006 Mavericks were a No. 4 seed primarily in name; they held the second-best record in the Western Conference but were ranked lower due to sharing a division with the top-seeded Spurs. The 2010 Celtics and 2018 Cavaliers were recent champions with established cores.
The Pacers, however, represented a relatively new phenomenon. A regular-season team considered squarely in the playoff middle tier transforming into a championship-level force in the postseason? That scenario is highly uncommon. At the start of the playoffs, they were significant underdogs, estimated at roughly 30-to-1 odds to win the Eastern Conference. Perhaps only the 2023 Heat team, which advanced through the Play-In Tournament, was a more surprising Finals participant in recent memory.
Indiana`s future outlook is now somewhat uncertain, particularly following Tyrese Haliburton’s Game 7 torn Achilles, which likely impacts their chances of returning to the Finals next season. Nevertheless, their unexpected playoff performance offers valuable lessons for other teams looking to build their rosters. Here are four key takeaways as the league heads into the offseason.
1. One Team`s Discard is Another Team`s Asset
Conventional wisdom often suggests that small-market contenders are primarily built through the draft. However, among the ten players the Pacers utilized most frequently in the postseason, only four were originally drafted by Indiana. Notably, three players were what might be termed `second-chance` acquisitions – players originally first-round picks for other franchises but acquired by the Pacers while still on their rookie contracts.
The most prominent example is, without question, Tyrese Haliburton. The Pacers acquired him in 2022 in exchange for Domantas Sabonis, a move that fundamentally reshaped the franchise. Had the Sacramento Kings foreseen Haliburton`s development, they would never have agreed to that trade. This potential for untapped value is precisely what makes `second-chance` acquisitions so appealing.
No players are more susceptible to circumstances than rookies. Consider Aaron Nesmith, who was drafted by a Boston Celtics team already loaded with talent. The Celtics reached the Finals in 2022, Nesmith`s second and final season with them. While they utilized Payton Pritchard somewhat for his shooting, Nesmith hadn`t yet found his offensive footing in the NBA, and the Celtics had established wings like Jayson Tatum, Jaylen Brown, and Marcus Smart. Boston had little way of knowing how much he would improve two years later. Although not merely a throw-in in the Malcolm Brogdon trade, he certainly wasn`t the primary focus.
Obi Toppin was drafted by Tom Thibodeau`s New York Knicks, and Thibodeau is known for rarely playing reserves significant minutes. Toppin was stuck behind Julius Randle, and Thibodeau, with his traditional approach, was unwilling to experiment with lineups featuring both players as power forwards. Ironically, the Pacers found success with such lineups because Rick Carlisle was creative enough to find ways to make them effective.
Many factors can hinder a rookie`s development: being drafted by a team with a positional logjam, landing with a franchise hyper-focused on immediate results rather than future growth, or simply having a coach who doesn`t grasp how to best utilize their skills. Haliburton faced some of these issues. The Pacers recognized the benefit of acquiring such players when their value is low, trusting that Carlisle can maximize their potential. A significant advantage is that these players are often acquired without giving up substantial assets and can be extended at reasonable salaries. Which brings us to the next point…
2. Extend Contracts Early
The Pacers are widely regarded as one of the NBA`s more financially conservative teams, having avoided paying the luxury tax for over two decades. Yet, in an era defined by stringent salary rules introduced by the 2023 collective bargaining agreement, the Pacers constructed a Finals contender built on depth. They achieved this not simply by tanking and accumulating young stars on rookie contracts; much of this core is on their second or later contracts. So, how did the Pacers manage to afford such depth? By extending players early.
Nesmith had played only about 1,200 career minutes when he joined Indiana. His third season showed promise, even earning him a starting spot, but his three-point shooting was only league average at that point, and he still needed significant defensive improvement. Nevertheless, the Pacers secured him with a three-year, $33 million rookie extension. That contract now appears to be a bargain, as Nesmith has developed into one of the league`s premier 3-and-D role players.
They were even more proactive with Myles Turner. In 2023, they had substantial in-season cap space. They could have used this space to absorb salaries from other teams in exchange for assets. Instead, they chose a different path, giving Turner a two-year, $60 million extension. While an annual average salary of $30 million was roughly fair market value, the Pacers leveraged their cap space to provide him an immediate $17.1 million raise during an otherwise unproductive season. This strategy allowed them to pay Turner less overall—approximately $41 million—over the past two years when they were focused on winning.
T.J. McConnell? Re-signed to a four-year extension last summer. Andrew Nembhard? Signed to what will almost certainly be a below-market four-year extension as soon as he was legally eligible. This is Indiana`s consistent approach. The Pacers take care of their players financially early on, and in return, they secure them at favorable costs. They avoid being forced into overpaying by market conditions because their players rarely reach unrestricted free agency.
There`s a crucial caveat: this strategy requires being as astute as the Pacers. The risk of extending players early is the possibility that they may not develop as hoped. Take Zeke Nnaji, who played only around 1,800 minutes in his first three seasons. Denver still committed to a four-year, $32 million extension, hoping he would become a value similar to Nesmith. Instead, his development stalled, making him borderline unplayable, and his contract is now a burden for Denver. Extending the wrong players prematurely can result in significant dead money. However, the Pacers excel at identifying and utilizing useful traits in players, making this approach reliably yield bargains for them.
In the current apron era, obtaining value and bargains is critical. For teams serious about championship aspirations, the potential reward of securing a value contract usually outweighs the risk of a situation like Nnaji`s. While it might not seem apparent, the Pacers are currently paying two max contracts to Tyrese Haliburton and Pascal Siakam. Building the surrounding depth the Pacers possess would be unfeasible if every player commanded full market value. The Pacers have demonstrated that by acting early, they can acquire good players at sufficiently discounted rates to maintain a competitive roster around their stars.
3. The Right Star is the Available Star
Consider what the Pacers ultimately surrendered to acquire Pascal Siakam:
- Bruce Brown, a free-agent signing who hadn`t fit as expected and whose salary was primarily used for matching purposes.
- Jordan Nwora, a young prospect who is now playing internationally in Turkey.
- Three first-round picks that landed at Nos. 19, 23, and 29 overall.
This was the cost to acquire the player who would become the Eastern Conference Finals MVP. It wasn`t as if this package was expected to fetch significantly more at the time, either; interest in Siakam was limited. Atlanta was the only other team known to have aggressively pursued him. The Sacramento Kings reportedly inquired but preferred OG Anunoby.
This preference for Anunoby makes some theoretical sense. Anunoby`s combination of shooting and elite defense makes him easily adaptable to nearly any roster. Players with similar archetypes have commanded enormous trade packages; for instance, the Knicks traded five first-round picks for Mikal Bridges. Siakam is a more complex fit. His shooting was a question mark before joining Indiana. While a strong defender, he lacks Anunoby`s positional versatility. He can`t just slot onto any team; he requires the right system or a team willing to build one. This complexity lowered his trade value.
The Pacers arguably had the flexibility to be more selective. They controlled all their own first-round picks and, in Haliburton, possessed the type of star who attracts other talent. Instead of waiting indefinitely for a perfect, possibly unavailable, target, they acquired the high-level player who was available at a reasonable price. This decision has paid immense dividends, resulting in two deep playoff runs with Siakam.
This logic doesn`t apply universally to every team. Franchises like the Spurs and Thunder, for example, are so young and rich in draft assets that they can afford the patience to wait for their ideal star acquisition. More common are small-market teams akin to the Pacers or the Cleveland Cavaliers, who made a similar, albeit more expensive, move to acquire Donovan Mitchell when that opportunity arose. Chances to land star players are infrequent, particularly in smaller markets. The Pacers` experience demonstrates that when such an opportunity materializes, it is usually prudent to seize it and address the subsequent roster challenges later.
4. Prioritize Roster Depth
Last offseason, the Philadelphia 76ers created approximately $60 million in cap space. Their intention was clear from the outset: sign a star. This aligns with conventional wisdom; we call it `max cap space` because it`s ideally intended to accommodate a single player`s maximum salary. True to form, they paid Paul George $49.2 million to play for them last season. Now, compare this to Indiana`s approach for a moment. Excluding players on rookie or max contracts, the Pacers paid their four market-value veterans—Myles Turner, Obi Toppin, Aaron Nesmith, and T.J. McConnell—a combined total of roughly $53.2 million, about $4 million more than George`s single salary.
This comparison is not meant as a blanket criticism of pursuing stars or signing max contracts. As discussed earlier, adding an available star can be highly beneficial. However, there`s crucial context. The Pacers designed their payroll structure to accommodate two stars. When you have the financial flexibility below that level, you can afford to pay a solid supporting cast. The 76ers, conversely, operated with a three-star salary structure (Embiid, Maxey, George). Predictably, their depth suffered significantly. When George and Joel Embiid faced injuries, the 76ers` performance deteriorated. Even when all three played, the team was only average, posting a 7-7 record in those games.
Indiana`s run—and Oklahoma City`s, for that matter—suggests that depth is more critical in the contemporary NBA than it once was. Playoff injuries are increasingly common, and the modern game demands more physically than in the past. While the bruising physicality has decreased (though it seems to reappear each spring with a more lenient playoff whistle), it`s been replaced by significantly increased speed and movement. Players tire more easily, and they are challenged far more strategically. A decade ago, having a center guard a non-shooting wing was revolutionary; now, it`s practically standard. Every minor weakness is targeted. Rosters must be adaptable enough to counter anything the four different playoff opponents might throw at them.
Maintaining depth was more feasible with three max contracts in the previous era. Teams had access to mid-level exceptions regardless of their spending level. Before the aprons, there was no significant penalty for retaining your own players beyond a higher luxury tax bill. Teams also had greater flexibility in trading. There were far more veterans willing to chase rings by signing for less than market value before contract extensions became so common. This is no longer the prevailing environment.
A team`s approach to depth can no longer be “we`ll figure it out later.” It must be an actively planned component of roster construction. This doesn`t entirely rule out three-star builds. The Thunder have one, but with two notable exceptions: two of their stars are still on rookie deals, and they possess such vast draft capital that they can cost-control their depth even after Jalen Williams and Chet Holmgren`s salaries increase. This is an unconventional approach, likely difficult for most teams to replicate, but the Thunder clearly built their roster with depth as a priority.
The key takeaway is this: we are no longer strictly in the “stack as many stars as humanly possible” era. While you undeniably need some level of star power (hence the lesson about acquiring the available star), you must dedicate sufficient resources to building adequate depth around them, because finding reliable depth on the cheap is no longer consistently possible.
For most teams, this likely means constructing two-star rosters. The Grizzlies seem to have moved in this direction, partially with their Desmond Bane transaction. Others will likely follow suit, which ironically might create opportunities for teams currently lacking a superstar to acquire one who might not have been available in prior years. A few three-star teams will exist, but almost all will be exceptions to the rule. Perhaps one player will be on a significantly below-market contract, like Stephen Curry between 2013 and 2016. Maybe key players will jointly agree to sacrifice salary for roster construction, as some Knicks players reportedly considered. Or possibly, a team will assemble such a rare and appealing collection of talent that its recruiting power overrides financial constraints. You might get away with three max contracts if those players were, say, LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh in 2010.
No such trio exists today, and teams cannot realistically plan for the ability to build one. The Pacers have presented the league with an alternative model. While conventional wisdom has often prioritized maximizing star power, the Pacers have just powerfully illustrated the importance of depth in the modern NBA landscape.
Jasper Hawthorne