Between 1949 and 1966, the NBA Draft order had a peculiar system called territorial picks. While the draft order was typically based on standings, teams could bypass it if a player had local ties, either growing up or playing college basketball in the team`s region. This resulted in 23 players being selected, with 12 eventually becoming Hall of Famers. The NBA, in its early days, aimed to foster regional support by directing stars to cities where they were highly desired. Although logical for its time, this system was easily abused.
In Wilt Chamberlain`s biography, `Larger than Life,` Robert Cherry revealed Red Auerbach`s strategy to have Chamberlain attend college in New England. This was a calculated move to later claim him for the Celtics using a territorial pick. Although this specific plan didn`t materialize, Auerbach found other ways to manipulate the system. In 1956, he secured both Tommy Heinsohn and Bill Russell in the same draft, without actually needing to pick Heinsohn. As a star from Holy Cross, Heinsohn allowed Auerbach to forfeit his low first-round pick and select him instead. To acquire Russell, Auerbach traded two veteran players, Ed Macauley and Cliff Hagan. Macauley himself was acquired because the St. Louis Bombers used a territorial pick in 1949 before folding. Auerbach obtained him in the subsequent dispersal draft and then used him to get Russell. This flawed system was instrumental in building Boston`s dynasty.
Another dynasty was unintentionally built through this system. In 1965, despite losing the NBA Finals to the Celtics, the Los Angeles Lakers drafted Gail Goodrich. Goodrich later contributed to the Lakers` 1972 championship. More significantly, when he signed with the New Orleans Jazz in 1976, free-agent signings triggered compensation, earning the Lakers three first-round picks. The last of these picks, in 1979, became Magic Johnson. While not the only impactful territorial picks (Chamberlain and Oscar Robertson were major beneficiaries), these examples illustrate how significantly draft night fortunes could alter team trajectories. The first decades of NBA history were significantly shaped by this rule.
In 1966, the NBA abolished territorial picks as the sport gained national prominence. Fairness became more important than local market interests. The draft`s purpose is to balance the league, ensuring that weaker teams get access to top talent. While largely effective, this system, like its predecessor, has been subject to exploitation.
The Current State of Tanking
Tanking, the strategy of intentionally losing to secure higher draft picks, is a well-known concept. As long as draft priority is tied to losing, teams will exploit this incentive. The territorial draft era highlights the necessity of a draft system based on reverse standings to prevent dominant teams from becoming even stronger. Therefore, a modern draft model is essential, although it doesn`t eliminate tanking entirely.
Management of tanking has been attempted over time. From 1966 to 1984, a coin flip decided the No. 1 pick between the worst two teams. This was abused, notably by the Houston Rockets in 1984 to draft Hakeem Olajuwon, leading to the introduction of the lottery system the following year. Recent tweaks to the lottery in 2019 aimed to further discourage tanking by flattening the odds. The top three teams now share a 14% chance at the No. 1 pick, down from 25% for the worst team, increasing odds for mid-ranked teams. The Play-In Tournament was also introduced to motivate mid-tier teams to compete for playoff spots.
Despite these efforts, widespread tanking persists. The Utah Jazz were recently fined $100,000 for violating player participation policies while vying for the worst record. The Toronto Raptors have adopted a strategy of limiting playing time for their best players in the fourth quarter, despite using them earlier in games. For instance, their top scorers, Scottie Barnes, RJ Barrett, and Immanuel Quickley, rank lower in fourth-quarter minutes in March. Quentin Grimes` efforts to hinder Philadelphia`s tanking are notable, but with key players like Joel Embiid, Paul George, and Tyrese Maxey sidelined, his impact is limited.
Tanking is rationalized by draft pick considerations. While the top pick odds are capped at 14%, teams like Utah aim to avoid falling too low in the draft order, as the worst team can drop to No. 5. For Philadelphia, the incentive is stronger as their pick is only protected if it remains in the top six. In an era dominated by superstar trades, pick protection tanking is increasingly common. Currently, half of the 2025 first-round picks are owned by different teams than originally drafted them. This trend suggests tanking to safeguard picks will continue and intensify, as seen with the Jazz whose pick is top-10 protected this year and top-8 protected next year when it again belongs to Oklahoma City if unprotected.
A Possible Tanking Solution
Completely eliminating tanking is likely impossible as any incentive to lose will be exploited. However, incremental improvements are achievable, and a new measure is needed. I propose freezing lottery odds at the All-Star break. The 14 non-playoff teams would still participate in the lottery, but their odds would be determined by their standings relative to each other at the All-Star break.
The All-Star break is a logical point. Philadelphia`s Daryl Morey highlighted this on February 7, just before the break, expressing postseason aspirations despite a 20-30 record. Since then, they`ve gone 3-18. Initially aiming to win, injuries derailed Philadelphia`s season, but their increased losses coincided with the realization that winning was no longer attainable.
This raises the question of whether teams like the 76ers should be rewarded with lottery wins. The draft lottery should benefit genuinely struggling teams, not just those who become unlucky or overtly strategize losses.
Consider the bottom of the standings: at the All-Star break, the Wizards were 9-45, and the Jazz were 13-41. Post-break, the Wizards improved to 6-10, a positive development in the NBA`s view, showing young team progress. However, this progress could negatively impact their draft position, especially as the Jazz are perceived to be manipulating the system.
This puts the Wizards in a difficult position. The Jazz, likely a better team, are seemingly gaming the system, yet the Wizards risk being penalized more in draft position for playing legitimately. Despite identical 14% odds for the top pick, the guaranteed higher floor of draft position for the Jazz due to tanking is a significant advantage, likely worth more than a $100,000 fine to any GM. This forces teams like the Wizards to consider tanking harder to protect their draft interests against teams like the Jazz, creating a dilemma between organic development and manufactured losing.
Tanking becomes contagious, intensifying as seasons progress and outcomes narrow. The 76ers, with preseason championship aspirations after signing Paul George and boasting other All-Stars, initially played as expected. Their early-season performance was a more accurate reflection of their team`s potential. Their current 12-win pace since Morey’s comment significantly affects their draft pick.
While full-season tanking will persist, it is arguably more transparent and acceptable. Teams deciding to tank from the outset acknowledge their need for high draft picks, allowing fans and broadcasters to adjust expectations. Late-season tanking of nationally televised games is undesirable, and eliminating the incentive to lose late in the season could encourage ticket sales.
This change might also discourage mid-season player trades aimed at tanking. For example, the Jazz, who were in Play-In contention at the trade deadline in both 2023 and 2024, traded away key veterans, impacting their competitiveness. While these trades might align with long-term plans, they clearly facilitated late-season losing. Should fans support teams deliberately weakening themselves mid-season for draft position?
Nets fans, for instance, effectively traded for the right to tank by regaining control of their draft picks but didn`t tank effectively enough initially. Despite mid-season trades to worsen their record, fans desired more drastic measures, even suggesting trading their second-leading scorer, Cam Johnson, to ensure more losses. Johnson himself expressed frustration with fans wanting the team to tank, emphasizing the players` commitment to winning, creating a conflict between player and team/fanbase objectives.
Quentin Grimes exemplifies this conflict. In a contract year, his improved performance is a personal success story, yet fans might resent it for potentially worsening the team`s draft position, possibly costing them a top prospect like Cooper Flagg or a protected pick.
While teams might still trade players to tank, freezing odds mid-season could shift these decisions to the offseason, which is more logical basketball-wise and less disruptive for players and their families. Mid-season trades are more disruptive than offseason moves.
Would It Work?
The key question is whether this would eliminate late-season tanking or just shift it to earlier in the season. The answer is likely a mix of both. Some teams might try to tank earlier, as each loss becomes more impactful in a shorter evaluation period. A 50-game sample for draft position calculation would heighten the stakes of early-season losses.
However, full-season tanking is a harder sell to owners than a late-season strategic punt. Executing an early-season tank is also more challenging as players are generally healthier earlier in the season, making it harder to justify benching them. Players, especially stars, are less likely to accept being sidelined in January and February when they are aiming for All-Star selections and playoff contention, even if realistically out of reach. While some manipulation might persist, it would likely be less blatant than current late-season tanking excesses.
This proposal is not a perfect solution but an incremental step to mitigate the worst aspects of tanking. It won`t eliminate it but could curb the most egregious late-season examples. Fans attending games want to see competitive basketball, not teams intentionally losing. While the current system encourages tanking, shifting the lottery odds determination to the All-Star break could promote more honest competition, especially in March and April, which currently often resemble a race to lose rather than real competition. This change, like past adjustments, is a step towards a fairer and more engaging NBA season.
Jasper Hawthorne